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This study examines the impact of alternative price stabilization policies for 
edible oils and oilseeds in India on the farmers growing oilseeds, the consumers of edible 
oils and the processing sector with the help of a multi market equilibrium dynamic 
simulation model. Price stability in the edible oil sector is important at least for two 
reasons. It can help realize the growth potential in the production of edible oils and 
improve the nutritional security of Indian households. While efficiency considerations 
suggest the linking of domestic to world prices, extreme fluctuations in price have to be 
avoided, for they can lead to undesirable consequences both at the macro and micro 
levels.  
The questions addressed in this study include the following. What is the 
effectiveness of alternative price stabilization mechanisms in stabilizing oilseed/ edible 
oil prices? Can variable levies that vary within the bound tariff level provide adequate 
protection against world price fluctuations? What are the costs to the government, 
benefits to producers and consumers? What is the impact on prices of oilseeds due to the 
operation of variable levies edible oil imports and vice versa?  
The following are some of the results obtained from the model. Higher import 
tariffs on edible oils lead to more variable domestic prices. This indicates that a fixed 
level of tariff even at a higher level is not useful in stabilizing oil prices. A system of 
variable levies which adjust to international price and domestic supply situation is what 
would be required. Tariff protection on oils mainly benefits the processing sector and the 
benefits to oilseed growers are relatively smaller. Tariff protection to growers by   iii
increasing tariffs on oilseed imports helps the producers of oilseeds, but at the cost of 
consumers and the processing sector. The distribution of benefits to different agents 
varies with the different alternative mechanisms used for price stabilization. As the bound 
rates of tariffs under WTO are fixed quite high for all edible oils with the exception of 
soy oil, there is enough room to adjust import duties for price stabilization purposes. The 
maximum import tariff rate required to stabilize prices within a reasonable price band is 
as low as 25%. iv 
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MANAGING PRICE VOLATILITY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY ENVIRONMENT: 










Economic globalization and increased trade liberalization makes it imperative to 
look for instruments that can effectively protect producers and consumers from the highly 
volatile international commodity prices. In India, currently the Central Government fixes 
Minimum Support Prices (MSP) for major agricultural commodities to ensure 
remunerative prices to farmers and prevent distress sales by the farmers. The MSP is 
linked to several factors, including the cost of production as estimated periodically by 
Commission on Agricultural Costs & Prices (CACP). These prices are administered 
through public and cooperative marketing agencies. With the opening up of the economy 
to external markets price support would be provided mostly through appropriate tariff on 
imports. Aligning the domestic prices with world prices could pose several challenges 
particularly due to high volatility of world prices. The adjustment costs are often much 
higher for the small and marginal farmers, small scale processors, and vulnerable 
consumers.  
In the absence of any coping strategy, or adequate protection the damage to their 
interests can be significant, which often results in blanket opposition to liberalization. To 
make the transition from a closed to open economy environment smooth, it is important  
                                                           
1 Professor at the Indira Gandhi Institute of development Research (IGIDR), General A. Vaidya Marg, 
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to examine the role of alternative policy instruments, domestic and external, and 
institutional reforms required to cope with the risks associated with a more open 
economy than what has been the case in the past. This would help a gradual adjustment in 
cropping patterns taking advantage of country￿s comparative advantage in a globalizing 
world.  
This study examines alternative price stabilization policies for edible oils and 
oilseeds in India. The impact of price stabilization on different agents, the farmers 
growing oilseeds, the consumers of edible oil and the processing sector is examined with 
the help of a multi market equilibrium model. This involves simulation exercises 
assuming different shocks to domestic production and world prices. Different alternative 
scenarios are considered in order to examine their relative influence on different agents.  
The importance of price stability in the edible oil sector can hardly be over 
emphasized. Production of oilseeds is a good avenue for agricultural diversification. 
Since production of oilseeds takes place in predominantly rainfed regions it is likely to 
have favorable distributional implications and also lead to more regionally balanced 
agricultural growth. While the current low levels of yields of most oilseeds compared to 
international levels can be increased through technological improvements, ensuring a 
more stable price environment would help realize this growth potential. The rising share 
of edible oils in Indian household budgets in recent years and the role it plays in 
nutritional security also underscores the importance of price stability. 
While efficiency considerations suggest the linking of domestic to world prices, 
extreme fluctuations in price have undesirable consequences both at the macro and micro 
levels. High food prices through their impact on wages and inflation can have a   3
destabilizing influence on the macro economy. At the micro level risk-averse farmers 
could decrease their investments thereby reducing output. Price support to farmers and 
tariff and other trade protection to the processing industry over the years implied there 
was less of a need to manage price risk. Moreover, in a policy controlled regime risk 
management markets and instruments such as futures and options contracts failed to 
develop. In order to provide greater role to the private sector the government has in recent 
years enlarged the coverage of futures markets to minimize the wide fluctuations in 
commodity prices and for hedging their risks. Extremely high prices are harmful to 
consumers especially in a poor country like India where share of food in household 
budgets is high and malnutrition is widespread. Hence price stabilization through 
appropriate measures becomes necessary to avoid the problems associated with 
commodity price fluctuations. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section provides the policy 
background, past policies and recent developments. It also gives a description of the 
issues currently faced by the oilseed and edible oils economy and of questions that are 
addressed in this paper. Section 3 provides a description of the model used. The 
subsequent section describes the alternative scenarios considered and the impacts of price 
stabilization obtained from model simulations under each of these scenarios. Section 5 
provides concluding remarks. 




2.1  TRENDS IN PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION 
 
 
Improved access to new technology, better access to markets and favorable policy 
environment (e.g. Soybean and Sunflower are exempt from the small scale industry 
reservation policy) has led to substantial growth in domestic production of oilseeds. A 
major part of the increase in output is due to area expansion while the contribution from 
yield increases has been relatively lower. Import substitution policies also helped in 
providing favorable price incentives with higher prices relative to competing crops. 
Nominal protection coefficients calculated for the major oilseeds, groundnut, rapeseed, 
soybean and sunflower were very high in most of the years (Gulati et al, 1996). Between 
1981-82 and 1993-94 the average annual growth rate oilseed production was more than 
twice that of food grains (Figure 1). Yield increases have mainly been due to 
technological changes such as development of shorter duration varieties and improved 
resistance to pests and moisture stress. Over the years yield variability has been on the 
decline mainly due to greater regional diversification of oilseed production and increased 
diversification across oilseeds. However, production and yields of oilseeds appear to have 
reached a state of stagnation in recent years (Figures 2 and 3). Yield levels for most 
oilseeds are less than half the level of other major oilseed producers in the world (World 
Bank, 1997). This is another reason for the low comparative advantage seen in the 
production of oilseeds.    5
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The demand for oils however, has been on the rise, partly due to rise in household 
incomes and partly due to reduction in prices as a result of trade liberalization. Price of 
edible oils relative to all food articles as well as the general wholesale price index has 
been on the decline since 1991-92 (Figure 4). Thus a large fraction of domestic demand is 
met by imports (Figure 5). While virtually the entire palm oil consumption is met through 
imports, large demand supply gaps are visible in Soybean and Rapeseed and Mustard oil 
(Figures 6 and 7). This tends to increase the vulnerability of domestic consumers and 
producers to fluctuations in world prices. World prices of edible oils are more volatile 
than domestic prices (Figure 8). 
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2.2 POLICY  TRENDS 
 
 
Market intervention in the case of edible oils has taken several forms. As the 
demand for edible oils far outstripped the supply, the government felt that the high 
dependence on imports is not desirable from the food security perspective. This led to the 
strategy of import substitution and infant industry protection. Imports of edible oils were 
only through the state trading agencies (canalized trade) until 1994. The high protection 
given to the industry was at the cost of oilseed growers and consumers. The restriction on 
oilseed exports until 1995 in fact hurt the growers and helped the processors.
2 The less 
efficient domestic processing industry is, due to protection and small scale reservations 
etc, the less would farmers receive as price for their output. The government fixes floor 
prices (MSP) to protect oilseed producers. The trends in MSP over the years suggest that  
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these are periodically revised upwards to reflect changes in input costs (Figure 9). The 
MSP is effective only in those years when the market prices tend to fall very much. 
Market intervention operations by the National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) 
between 1989 and 1994 were the first major attempt by the government to stabilize 
oilseed/edible oil prices with a predetermined price-band. NDDB did this through buffer 
stocks and imports (of both oilseed and oil).
3 Given the importance of edible oils in the 
dietary requirements of households the Department of Food and Public Distribution 
under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution, distributes edible 
oil under PDS at lower than market prices. 
 







































                                                           
3 The involvement of NDDB in oil price stabilization is not due to the fact that edible oils are substitute 
products for butter and ghee. The government wanted to extend the success of the cooperative movement to 
edible oil sector so that oilseed farmers￿ income increased and production of oilseeds encouraged (see Box 
1).   11
With the opening up of trade the government fixed import duties on edible oils in 
order to protect the domestic industry. In practice the import tariffs are fixed at varying 
levels not exceeding the bound rate committed to under the trade agreement. In order to 
prevent under invoicing of imports the government fixes a tariff value, which may be 
different from the actual price at which the imports take place. For example in the case of 
soybean oil the tariff value was fixed at $600 per tonne even though the actual price in 
the international market was in the range of $510 to $520 per tonne.
4 Due to this the 
effective duty on Soy oil at times can even exceed the bound rate. Price intervention by 
the government tries to strike a balance between the producer and consumer interests. 
While high tariffs on import of edible oils are in the interest of the edible oil industry and 
perhaps oilseed growers, it could be at the expense of consumers who pay a higher price. 
The oilseeds sector comes under the Essential commodities Act, which imposes legal 
controls on interstate movement and storage of oilseeds.  The small-scale sector 
reservation for the edible oils industry has been responsible for inefficiencies in 
production. Most (60-70 percent) of the crude edible oil refining units are small with 
capacity utilization as low as 40 percent.  
In the recent years however, due to India￿s commitments made under the WTO, 
quantitative restrictions on import of edible oils have been removed. The import of 
refined palm oil was put under open general license (OGL) in March 1994, which means 
that it can be imported without seeking any government approval. Other edible oils were 
put under OGL in April 1995.  Recently duties have been reduced drastically on both 
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refined and non-refined (crude) edible oil.
5 Although India￿s share in world oilseed 
production is quite substantial (Table 2) and it is a big exporter of groundnuts and sesame 
(Table 3) it fails to meet the domestic consumption requirements of edible oils. India￿s oil 
imports form a big share in world trade especially in Palm and Soy oil. It ranks among 
the top ten importers of Palm, Soya and Rapeseed/Mustard oil (Tables 4 and 5). Bulk of 
the edible oil imports under the Open General License (OGL) is RBD palmolein of 
Malaysian and Indonesian origin (Table 6). A major proportion of Soy oil imports are 
from Argentina. Brazil, South Africa and USA are the other countries from which we 
import larger quantities (Table 7). Palm oil accounts for 60 percent of imports, while 
soybean and sunflower seed oil accounted for 20 and 13 percent respectively. The import 
duty rates on edible oils are revised periodically depending on the demand supply gap 
and the level of international prices. The bound rates of tariffs under WTO are fixed quite 
high for all edible oils with the exception of soybean oil (Table 8). There is thus enough 
room to adjust import duties for price stabilization purposes.  
For Rape, Colza or Mustard oil, up to an aggregate of 150000 tonnes of total 
Imports in a financial year (under Tariff Rate Quota) a lower the import duty applies 
(45% instead of 75%). 
Recently the government has also permitted futures trading in several edible oils 
and oilseeds. Producers, traders as well as consumers are expected to benefit from this 
measure. The importers of edible oils who are exposed to risks arising out of 
unprecedented price fluctuations in the international market can hedge their risk though 
the futures market. The wholesalers who buy from importers for distant deliveries can 
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cover their risks against their forward purchases. The price discovery made in the futures 
markets can help farmers plan their sowing operations and decide on the commodity that 
will fetch remunerative prices. Crushers can also hedge the oil by entering into forward 
purchases in the futures market. Futures trading will bring in stability in prices, which 
would help in reducing the government￿s burden of price stabilization.  
   14
Table 1￿Import Policy for Edible Oils and Oilseeds 
 
Edible oils   




Import of all edible oils (except coconut oil) placed on OGL with 30% Import Duty. 
 
1996-97 (In Regular 
Budget) 
 
Further Reduction in Import Duty to 20% + 2% Surcharge. Another Surcharge of 3% was 












Import Duty on Crude Oils Raised to 25% (Basic)+10% (Surcharge) = 27.5% In Addition 




Import Duty on Crude Oils to 25% (Basic) + 10% (Surcharge) = 27.5% and on Refined 
Oils Raised to 35% (Basic) +10% (Surcharge) + 4% (SAD) = 44.04% Import Duty on 
Crude Palm Oil (CPO) for Manufacture of Vanaspati Retained at 15% (Basic) + 10% 




Import Duty on CPO for Manufacture of Vanaspati Raised to 25% and on Crude 
Vegetable Oils Raised to 35%. Import Duty on CPO for other than Vanaspati 
Manufacture Raised to 55%. Import Duty on Refined Vegetable Oils Raised to 45% 
(Basic) + 4% (SAD) = 50.8% Import Duty on Refined Palm Oil and RDB Palmolein 
Raised to 65% (Basic) + 4% (SAD) = 71%. 
 
March, 2001 (As 
Amended on 26-4-2001) 
 
Import Duty on Crude Oils Raised to 75% Except Soybean Oil. The Duty on Refined Oils 
Including RDB Palmolein Raised to 85% (Basic) Except in the Cases of Soybean Oil and 




Import Duty on Crude Palm Oils and Its Fractions, of Edible Grade, in Loose or Bulk 




















Export of sesame seed allowed subject to quantitative ceiling 
 
Union budget 2000-2001 
 
Free import of all oilseeds at 35% import duty has been allowed without any quantitative 
licensing requirements 
 
Source: Annual Report 2001-02, Department of Food and Public Distribution. SAD denotes Special 
Additional Duty.    15
Table 2￿India’s Share in World Production of Oilseeds 
 
Oil Seeds (Qty. in Million tonnes)  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Soybean                     
     World   124.54  132.80  158.17  159.80  171.14 
     India (percent share)  3.49  3.07  3.25  3.06  3.97 
Cotton Seed                     
     World  35.30  34.48  34.68  33.55  33.19 
     India (percent share)  15.13  17.08  6.20  15.80  14.16 
Groundnut                     
     World  20.43  20.85  20.28  21.47  22.87 
     India (percent share)  25.70  28.30  26.63  24.73  29.03 
Sunflower Seed                     
     World  26.11  24.58  24.07  26.91  23.34 
     India (percent share)  5.05  5.37  4.82  2.97  2.99 
Rapeseed                     
     World  34.59  30.98  33.12  42.64  37.61 
     India (percent share)  17.55  20.34  14.04  13.98  11.33 
Sesame seed                     
     World  2.41  2.64  2.75  2.81  3.02 
     India (percent share)  22.82  25.38  26.91  18.15  17.55 
Palm Kernel                     
     World  4.75  5.03  4.77  6.14  6.48 
     India (percent share)  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.13  0.19 
Copra                     
     World  4.66  5.36  5.15  5.30  5.54 
     India (percent share)  14.38  13.43  14.37  12.45  13.36 
Linseed                     
     World  2.54  2.30  2.43  2.97  2.34 
     India (percent share)  12.20  13.91  6.07  9.76  11.11 
Castor seed                     
     World  1.22  1.12  1.19  1.24  1.39 
     India (percent share)  76.23  68.75  67.23  62.90  75.54 
Total                     
     World  256.55  259.42  286.61  302.83  306.92 
     India (percent share)  9.66  10.00  8.41  8.09  8.40 
 
Source: Annual Report 2000-01, Indian Vanaspati Producers Association. 
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Table 3￿Oilseed exports: India and the world (average of 1997-99) 
 









% of World 
Total 
China 492247.00  24.07  India  102030.33 17.40 
Argentina 368505.00  18.02  China  61395.00  10.47 
United States of 
America 
319010.33 15.60 Guatemala  31098.67  5.30 
India  217262.00 10.62 Nigeria  30666.67  5.23 
Netherlands  134592.67 6.58 Ethiopia  30166.67  5.14 
South  Africa  45291.00 2.21 Mexico  20254.33  3.45 
Germany  29354.33 1.44 Netherlands  13784.33  2.35 
Canada  28279.67 1.38 Tanzania,  United  Rep 
of 
12977.33 2.21 
Nicaragua  24947.67 1.22 Pakistan  11301.00  1.93 
United  Kingdom  14809.00 0.72 Thailand  11080.00  1.89 
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
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Table 4￿India and the world: Top Ten Importers of Groundnut and 
Rapeseed/Mustard oil  (Average of 1997-99) 
 








%of World Total 
France  75552.67 26.02 USA  446807.67  13.35 
Italy  45949.67 15.82 Netherlands  309716.67  9.26 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
28232.33 9.72 China  258906.67  7.74 
Germany 18796.33  6.47  United  Kingdom  202967.67  6.07 
USA 18714.67  6.45  Belgium-
Luxembourg 
175899.33 5.26 
Switzerland 15149.00  5.22  Russian  Federation  157897.67  4.72 
Netherlands 13006.67  4.48  India  144888.67 4.33 
China 9669.67  3.33  Germany  133374.67  3.99 
United Kingdom  4478.67  1.54  France  127373.67  3.81 
Mali 3000.00  1.03  Mexico  83668.33  2.50 
India 278.00  0.10       
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
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Table 5￿India and the world: Top Ten Importers of Palm and Soybean oil 
(Average of 1997-99) 
 
Palm oil  Soybean oil 
Country Metric  tonnes  % of World 
Total  Country Metric  tones  % of World 
Total 
India 2177302.67  17.17  China  1001748.33  13.41 
China 1259782.67  9.93  Iran  528597.67  7.07 
Pakistan 1026609.33  8.09  Bangladesh  502508.33  6.72 
Netherlands 666079.00  5.25  India  475220.67 6.36 
Germany 591703.67  4.67  Netherlands  283656.00  3.80 
United 
Kingdom 
490799.33 3.87  Pakistan  269026.67  3.60 
Japan 413258.67  3.26  Morocco  180288.33  2.41 
Egypt 390287.67  3.08  Brazil 178525.33  2.39 
Iraq 285563.67  2.25  Turkey  170262.67  2.28 




Source: FAOSTAT.   19
Table 6￿Country wise imports of Palm oil by India 
 
Quantity (in tones) 




Indonesia 64.09  578.45 
Argentina -  0.25 
Malaysia 31.32  231.07 
Thailand 2.044  17.29 
Chinese Taipei  -  0.5 
German F Rep  -  1 
Italy -  1 
Singapore -  3.74 
South Africa  -  0.5 
Crude Palm Oil and 
its Fractions 
USA -  2.46 
Australia 0.75  0.75 
Argentina -  6.84 
Brazil 0.5  - 
Canada 0.75  - 
China P RP  0.49  0.7 
German F Rep  0.25  - 
Indonesia 646.08 592.15 
Japan 6.481  - 
Malaysia 2090.56  1236.65 
Netherlands 1  4.829 
Singapore 11.09  1.52 
Thailand 0.5  6.46 
Ukraine 1.09  - 
Refined Palm Oil 
and its Fraction 
USA 11.39  0.5 
 
Source: Lok Sabha Un starred Question No. 2028, dated 3.8.2001, as provided by  
             http://www.indiastat.com .   20
Table 7￿Country wise imports of Soybean oil by India 
 
Quantity (in tonnes) 




Argentina 12.710325  152.095758 
Indonesia 1.5  - 
Brazil -  19.712 
Italy -  0.25 
Malaysia -  2.251456 
South Africa  2  7.5 
Thailand -  4.298344 
Soyabean Crude Oil 
W/N Degummed 
USA -  6.18923 
Argentina 300.201752  254.923878 
Brazil 183.374683  40.082 
Canada 0.023  - 
German F Rep  2.123  - 
Denmark -  0.02 
Indonesia 1  - 
Malaysia 0.26639  0.001465 
Netherlands 6.5  0.5 
Saudi Arabia  2.7  - 
Korea RP  -  0.001 
South Africa  12.103322  20.39605 
Switzerland -  0.02 
Thailand -  0.25 
Other Soyabean Oil 
and its Fractions 
USA 75.322785  40.290462 
 
Source: Lok Sabha Un starred Question No. 2028, dated 3.8.2001. (as provided by  
             http://www.indiastat.com ) .   21
Table 8￿Tariffs and bound rates on major edible oils (as on April 2002) 
 

















Soyabean Oil  45  45  Soyabean Oil  45  4%  45 
Palm Oil (for 
Manufacture of 
Vanaspati) 
65 300  RBD 
Palmolein 
85 4% 300 
Palm Oil (for other 
than Manufacture of 
Vanaspati) 
65 300  Palm  Oil  85  4%  300 
Groundnut Oil  75  300  Groundnut Oil  85  4%  300 
Sunflower/Safflower 75 300  Sunflower/Saff
lower 
85 4% 300 
Coconut Oil  75  300  Coconut Oil  85  4%  300 
Rapeseed Oil  75  75  Rapeseed Oil  75  4%  75 
Colza or Mustard Oil  75  75  Colza or 
Mustard Oil 
75 4%  75 
Other Oils  75  300  Other Oils  85  4%  300 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2002, Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of India. 
 
Note: For all refined oils a special additional customs duty of 4% applies in addition to the basic duty. For 
crude Sunflower or Safflower Oil up to an aggregate of 150000 tonnes of total Imports in a financial 
year (under Tariff Rate Quota) a lower the import duty applies (50% instead of 75%). 
 
2.3  ISSUES AND QUESTIONS 
 
 
The following are some of the key issues that arise in the context of trade 
liberalization. High volatility in world prices could cause disruption in production and 
consumption patterns in an open economy. In such an eventuality it is the vulnerable 
sections, farm labor, small farmers and poor consumers that are likely to be affected the 
most. The need to minimize such disruptions by stabilizing prices then becomes obvious. 
However, a balance needs to be struck between the interests of oilseed growers, the 
processing sector that produces oil and meal and the consumers of edible oil.    22
The questions that arise in this context are the following: 
-  How are the interests of the domestic oilseed and edible oil sector linked? 
-  What are the alternative instruments available in an open economy environment, to 
cope with large fluctuations in world prices?  
-  What should be the target price around which prices need to be stabilized? For 
example, what should be the ideal base level of tariff protection to the oilseeds and 
edible oils sectors? 
-  What are the alternative instruments available for price stabilization that are 
compatible with the agreement under the WTO? 
-  Can variable levies that vary within the bound tariff level provide adequate protection 
against world price fluctuations?
6 
-  How should the variable levies be fixed? On edible oils as well as oilseeds?  
-  What are the costs to the government, benefits to producers and consumers? 
It is important to know how different interests are served by price stabilization. 
How much do the producers of oilseeds gain? How much of the gain goes to the 
consumers? And how much to the edible oils industry? The level of protection given to 
oilseed growers would to some extent determine the level of protection from imports that 
the edible oils industry would require and vice versa. The target price around which 
prices are stabilized is an important choice variable. In general, a high target-price on 
                                                           
6 As per the current status variable levies are permitted under the WTO only under the special safeguard 
clause (article 5). Article 5 allowed for the imposition of an additional customs duty, over and above the 
base tariff, when a "trigger" price or a "trigger" volume was reached for the product in question. The use of 
the special safeguards required two preconditions which were set out in the first part of subparagraph 1, i.e. 
"tariffication" (or the conversion into ordinary customs duties of non-tariff border measures) of the 
products to which the special safeguard was to apply; and the designation of the product in question with 
the symbol "SSG" in the Member’s schedule. This latter condition is not met in the case of edible oils. 
Nevertheless future negotiations could make this possible.   23
import-competing agricultural goods could lead to high protection and distort efficient 
resource allocation process. Tariff protection to producers is required mainly in the case 
where imports are likely to reduce their share in a limited market. However, if consumer 
incomes are rising, leading to rapid growth in edible oil demand, then there is no reason 
for discouraging imports so long as equilibrium prices are high giving reasonable profits 
to crushing firms and farmers. The transition to a liberalized trade regime can be 
smoothened by gradually varying the target price over time starting from a level based on 
the cost of domestic production to a level consistent with the long term trend values of 
border prices.  
A system of variable import tariffs can be a more cost effective mechanism to 
stabilize prices compared to buffer stocks. Encouraging private trade and storage by 
removing restrictions and encouraging forward/futures trading with appropriate 
regulatory mechanisms/institutions can bring in price stability and reduce the cost burden 
on government. 
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3.  PRICE STABILIZATION MODEL 
 
A model of the edible oils market is necessary to simulate the impact of various 
policy scenarios. This would involve the specification of domestic demand and supply 
equations for edible oils and import demand equations. The implications of stabilizing 
prices of major edible oils can be worked out for alternative methods of stabilization, e.g., 
variable import tariffs/subsidies and buffer stocks. The implications of stabilizing oil 
prices on oilseeds and vice versa can be worked out using the backward and forward 
linkages respectively.  
Since India is a net importer of edible oils and since it tries to set domestic price 
above the world price a base level tariff is introduced for this purpose. The fluctuations in 
world prices would however be reflected in domestic prices. Under a price band policy 
domestic prices are allowed to vary with the fluctuations in world prices but in a 
controlled manner. Under this policy a set of ceiling and floor prices is specified and 
variable tariffs are imposed on top of the base level tariff in order to prevent prices from 
going outside the price band. This policy could also be implemented through buffer 
stocks and canalized imports by government agencies. Both these alternatives are 
analyzed in the simulation exercises below. The model used here is similar to that used in 
(Srinivasan and Jha, 2001).
7 
                                                           
7 There are options where government can attempt to stabilize prices without direct intervention by 
encouraging hedging activities through commodity futures/options markets. Hedging involves buying or 
selling of commodity futures/ options whose payoffs are linked to prices of commodities sold or bought in 
the future. It allows the sharing of risk with speculators who are willing to take on the price risks. (Faruqee 
and Coleman, 1996) provide an illustration of how price stability is can be achieved through such means. 
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3.1  SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
 
Market equilibrium prices of oilseeds, oil and meal are determined by equating 
demand to supply in the respective markets.  
3.1.1 Market  for  oilseeds 
Supply of oilseeds is given as the sum of domestic production less addition to 
stocks plus imports. Planned production is among other things a function of expected 
future price of oilseeds. Realized output is subject to random fluctuations caused by 
weather conditions. Imports are determined as the difference between demand and supply 
for a given realization of world price of oilseeds. World price is taken as given if the 
assumption of small economy is valid. If not, world price depends on the magnitude of 
India￿s imports. Demand for oilseeds is mainly from the processing industry (crushing 
demand) and a small fraction is used for direct consumption. Market equilibrium for 
oilseeds is obtained by price mechanism equating total demand to total supply. 
 
Production + Net depletion of stocks + net imports = crushing demand  
(by the processing industry). 
 
Processing industry is assumed to produce joint products, oil and meal in fixed 
proportions. Oil output is assumed to be aC where C denotes Crushing demand and ￿a￿ 
the oil content of seeds by weight. Similarly meal output is taken to be bC where ￿b￿ 
denotes meal content of seeds by weight.   26
Equilibrium price is obtained by equating total demand (crushing + other demand) 
to the total supply of seed (domestic production + net imports + net depletion in stocks). 
Domestic production is a function of expected future price and realized shock to yield.  
Crushing demand is a function of crushing margins. Crushing margins depend on 
the prices of oil, meal and seed and the extraction rates of oil and meal from the seed.i.e. 
crushing margin, cm = a p
oil  + b p
meal ￿ p
seed where a and b denote the technical 
extraction rates (amount of oil/meal by weight per unit weight of seed) of oil and meal 
respectively (Table 9). Oilseed crush demand is motivated by the size of the crush margin 
relative to the cost of crushing. Since processing of oilseeds is not modeled it is implicitly 
assumed that average costs are constant. This is obviously appropriate only for a short 
run analysis. Due to this specification of crush demand, C=C(cm) changes in crush 
demand in the model indicate movement along the demand curve and not shifts in the 
curve.
8  
Planned production of oilseeds is a function of expected future prices. In the 
model the expected seed price is obtained as five-year moving average. Realized 
production is obtained by adding the weather induced shock to planned production. 
Current seed price adjusts to bring about market equilibrium (commodity balance) in the 
seeds market in the absence of any intervention by the government. In the case of price  
intervention by the government in the form of say minimum support price (MSP) the  
                                                           
8 Currently most of the processing plants in India are operating at a low capacity. With a reduction or 
elimination of tariff barriers on oilseeds there would be increased availability of oilseeds allowing 
processing plants to operate at a higher level. This would reduce unit costs and may lead to an outward shift 
in the crush demand schedule in the medium or long run. Thus, e.g. a reduction in the price of domestic oil 
due to decreases in oil tariffs need not reduce the prices for oilseed farmers if there is a compensating 
change in the crushing efficiency. For a given oil demand curve if the supply curve for shifts outward it 
increases the derived demand for oilseeds and hence their prices other things remaining constant.   27
equilibrium conditions constitute in addition to the commodity balance equation an 
inequality condition which specifies that oilseed price cannot exceed the MSP. This in 
fact, is a complementarity condition which states that, government stocks are zero if 
market equilibrium price of oilseed is strictly greater than MSP and also that if 
government stocks are positive then market equilibrium price is equal to MSP. 
 
Table 9￿Conversion ratios between raw material and processed products 
 






Groundnut 40  60 
Sesamum 45  55 
Rapeseed-Mustard   33  67 
Linseed 43  57 
Castor seed  42  58 
Cottonseed 11  89 
Copra 65  35 
Niger seed  30  70 
Soybeans   18  73 
 
Source: The Solvent Extractor￿s Association of India, Annual Report-2002-03. 
Note: Hull from Soybeans crushed forms 8% and wastage 1%. 
 
In the case where oilseed imports are liberalized we have another inequality that 
is satisfied at equilibrium namely that domestic price is less than or equal to the import 
parity price. This is a complementarity condition which states that imports are zero if 
domestic price is strictly lower than import parity price and that if imports are positive in 
equilibrium then domestic price is equal to the import parity price. In this case supporting 
farmers￿ price at MSP may require the use of variable import tariffs in addition to the 
buffer stock policy. When import parity or trigger price is greater than domestic price,   28
imports are zero and no tariffs are required. However, if import trigger price were lower 
than MSP, positive import tariff would be required to support the price at MSP.  
Equilibrium in the oilseed market is therefore characterized by the following set 
of equations.  
3.1.2  Commodity balance equation 
Oilseed output (Q
oilseed) + opening stocks (gs-1) + imports (m
oilseed) = crushing 
demand (C) + other demand + closing stocks (gs) 
 









Assuming that the crushing industry is competitive, cm is obtained from the arbitrage 
relationship concerning the three prices given as cm = a p
oil + b p
meal  - p
oilseed. 
3.1.3 Complementarity  conditions 
1) price of oilseed (p
oilseed)  ≥ MSP for oilseed (msp
oilseed) ; government stocks 
(gs
oilseed) ≥ 0; and gs
oilseed (p
oilseed ￿ msp
oilseed) = 0 
 
 
This determines the closing government stocks of oilseeds. 
 
2)  import trigger price of oilseed (pm
oilseed)  ≥ price of oilseed (p
oilseed) ; imports 
(m
oilseed) ≥ 0; and m
oilseed (pm
oilseed ￿ p
oilseed) = 0 
 
 
This determines the quantity of oilseed imports in the liberalized trade scenario 
 
3)  import trigger price of oilseed (pm
oilseed)  ≥ MSP for oilseed (msp
oilseed) ; import 
tariff (tm
oilseed) ≥ 0; and tm
oilseed (pm
oilseed ￿ msp
oilseed) = 0   29
This determines the tariff level on imports required to keep equilibrium price from going 
below MSP in the liberalized trade scenario. 
Price of seed at wholesale level is price at farm level plus wholesaler and 
marketing margins. In general, marketing margins account for the price difference 
between the wholesale market (major markets) and the farm gate (most important 
producing areas) and consist of transport costs, taxes, insurance, interest charges, 
bagging, packing and handling charges, grading, storage and bulk handling charges. In 
the case of commodities that require processing, processing charges are also included 
(e.g. crushing margins in the case of edible oils). 
External trade margins are taken into account in deriving export/import trigger 
prices at domestic wholesale market level from world market prices (fob in the case of 
exports and cif in the case of imports). For exports we subtract trade margins from world 
market prices and for imports we add trade margins. External trade margins include 
foreign exchange brokerage, export/import registration fees, insurance costs, domestic 
freight, port charges, import/ export taxes, VAT and other domestic taxes. 
If we make the ￿large country￿ assumption then import trigger price for oilseeds 
would be a function of the magnitude of imports: pm
oilseed = pm
0 + β m
oilseed . In the case 
of a ￿small economy￿ assumption pm
oilseed = pm
0 = p
world (1 + import tariff ￿ import 
subsidy + trade margins). 
If the government wants to implement a price band stabilization policy, then in 
addition to a lower bound on price (MSP) it will fix an upper bound on price, pmax and 
attempts to maintain prices within this band. In this case we have another 
complementarity condition to maintain equilibrium price below pmax.   30
4) upper bound on oilseed price (pmax
oilseed)  ≥ import trigger price of oilseed 
(pm
oilseed); import subsidy (sm
oilseed) ≥ 0; and sm
oilseed (pmax
oilseed - pm
oilseed ) = 0 
 
This condition gives the import subsidy required to keep equilibrium price below 

















3.1.4 Market  for  oil 
Equilibrium oil price is obtained by equating total demand for oil with total 
supply. Total supply of oil is the sum of domestically produced and imported oil. 
Domestic supply is a product of the technical extraction coefficient and the crushing 
demand for seed. Total demand consists of only the domestic demand and is a function of 
price and income obtained (oil is assumed to be a net importable commodity). 
Equilibrium in the oil market is denoted by the equality of supply and demand as 
in the case of oilseeds. 
aC + net imports (m
oil) + net depletion of stocks (sg-1 ￿ sg
oil) 




imports  imports 
demand demand
Oilseed market: small economy Oilseed market: large economy   31
Demand for oil is a function of own price and prices of substitute oils and income. 
Supply is a function of crushing margins. Unlike in the case of oilseed, production of oil 
is assumed to be instantaneous. 
The complementarity conditions are similar to the case of oilseeds. 
1)  price of oil (p
oil)  ≥ MSP for oil (msp
oil) ; government stocks (gs




oil) = 0 
2)  import trigger price of oil (pm
oil)  ≥ price of oil (p
oil) ; imports (m




oil) = 0 
3)  import trigger price of oil (pm
oil)  ≥ MSP for oil (msp
oil) ; import tariff (tm




oil) = 0 
4)  upper bound on oil price (pmax
oil)  ≥ import trigger price of oil (pm
oil); import 
subsidy (sm
oil) ≥ 0; and sm
oi (pmax
oil - pm
oil ) = 0 
 
If we make the ￿large country￿ assumption then import trigger price would be a 
function of the magnitude of imports: pm
oil = pm
0 + β m




world (1 + import tariff  ￿ import subsidy + trade 
margins). 
3.1.5  Market for meal 
Equilibrium meal price is obtained by equating total demand for meal with total 
supply. Demand for meals is the sum of domestic and export demands. Supply of meal is 
obtained as a product of the technical extraction coefficient and crushing demand for seed 
(meal is assumed to be a net exportable commodity).    32
Equilibrium in the meal market is therefore given by the equality, supply of meal 
(bC) = domestic demand for meal + net exports. 
 
The complementarity conditions in this case will be 
export trigger price of meal (px
meal)  ≥ price of meal (p
meal) ; exports (x




meal) = 0 
 
If we make the ￿large country￿ assumption then export trigger price would be a 
function of the magnitude of imports: px
oil = px
0 - γ x




world (1 ￿ tax/tariff rate - trade margins). 
 
















3.1.6 Government￿s  objectives 
The government￿s objective is to strike a balance between price stability achieved 
in oilseed/oil market and its budgetary costs while choosing the levels at which prices of 







Meal market: small economy  Meal market: large economy   33
prices by resorting to quantitative controls on trade in food grains and maintaining buffer 
stocks. With greater trade liberalization new instruments that affect international trade are 
becoming important for stabilization of food supplies and prices. For instance, the 
government can keep domestic prices under control by changing tariffs on imports or by 
altering export taxes on the affected commodities. Price bands (i.e. permitting the 
domestic price to fluctuate within pre-specified limits) can be a more efficient price 
stabilization instrument in "truncating" the extreme parts of world price distribution. 
Price bands have been in use in some Latin American countries. Use of large buffer 
stocks under public control to stabilize food supplies and prices has proven to be 
expensive, due to large storage losses, high administrative costs, and high opportunity 
cost of the tied capital (Knudsen and Nash, 1990). It is also known to displace private 
storage activities. 
It is often argued that price bands implemented through variable levies dilute the 
scope for international markets to spread the risk of uncertainty in regional supply (or 
demand). They tend to export their instability to other markets, thereby exacerbating the 
volatility in unprotected markets. However, distinction needs to be made between the use 
of variables levies for outright protection (e.g. maintain domestic price far higher than 
what prevails in international markets) as opposed to that for controlling domestic price 
volatility caused by production instability. So long as the base tariff is fixed at a low level 
it need not be construed as a measure of protection. Moreover, so long as variable levies 
allow domestic price to vary in a reasonably wide price band rather than attempt to keep 
it at a constant level it is unlikely to destabilize prices of other countries. In fact, not   34
having a stabilization policy would amount to freely importing instability from other 
countries.  
In the model we analyze the impact of price band policies on the welfare of 
consumers and producers. The price band is usually fixed relative to a reference or target 
price. There can be different alternative bases for the specification of a particular 
reference price.  
•  One option is to take the trend world price (adjusting for trade margins and 
applying zero tariffs) as the reference price. This based on the reasoning that 
efficiency of resource allocation can be achieved by linking domestic prices to 
world prices (that reflect the opportunity costs). The lower and upper bound of the 
price band is chosen to taking a certain percentage deviation from the target price.  
•  Alternatively the target price can be calibrated to achieve a certain desired level of 
self-sufficiency by choosing a suitable base level tariff.  
•  Or, the reference price can be fixed at a level such that a desired level of per 
capita consumption at the national level is achieved. 
Policy discussions at times fail to distinguish between policies that aim to achieve 
price stability and those that are intended to protect farmers against cheaper imports. For 
example the minimum support price MSP is generally fixed at a level that tends to cover 
costs of production although in general discussions this is seen as an instrument for price 
stabilization. For an open economy environment, in particular, a clear distinction needs to 
be made between these two objectives.   35
3.1.7  Implementing the price band 
Given the price band prices are maintained within this band by alternative means. 
•  Buffer stocks and canalized trade: In one of the alternatives when price (of say a 
particular oilseed) tends to fall below the floor level of the price band (MSP) the 
government or its agencies stand ready to purchase and stock any amount that is 
sold by farmers at MSP (subject of course to the storage capacity). Similarly, if 
price tends to go above the ceiling price despite the government depleting its 
entire stocks the government￿s agency imports enough quantity and sells it 
domestically to keep the price within the bound (this is the case when imports 
were not liberalized and canalized through state trading agencies). 
•  Variable levies obtained as equilibrium values from the model: Another 
alternative is to impose the required level of import tax to prevent domestic 
equilibrium price from going below the lower bound. Similarly, provide the 
required level of import subsidy when domestic equilibrium price tends to go 
above the upper bound. With the help of the model the precise levels of import 
tax/subsidy required to maintain prices within the specified price band is obtained 
as a part of the solution to the edible oils market equilibrium. Given the level of 
minimum support price for oilseed/oil, the model would determine the extent of 
import tariff required to support the price at that level. But how could one fix 
variable tariffs in practice? One way is to specify a simple policy rule.   36
•  Variable levies obtained through administrative rule: Alternatively, an 
administrative rule can be specified as in (Storm, 1999) to arrive at the variable 
tariff/subsidy that can be imposed on imports in order to stabilize domestic prices. 
In this case the value of the variable tariff/subsidy depends on the deviation of the 
equilibrium price from the target or reference price and is given by the following 
functional relationship. 













, 1  
 
i denotes any of the oils/oilseeds and 2α denotes the width of the price band. The 
quadratic function implies that variable levy is raised relatively more when 
market price p deviates more from the target price p*.
9 
 
A policy function makes it relatively simpler to administer the variable levy 
system. In the case where price band is specified one would have to solve the model for 
each of the different realizations of world oil/oilseeds price and domestic output of 
oilseeds. Alternatively, a policy function can be derived from the equilibrium values of 
tariffs, prices and quantities obtained from the price band stabilization simulations. 
                                                           
9 This rule treats deviations from target price (positive and negative) symmetrically. We could have rules 
which treat the deviations asymmetrically, e.g. 
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Through regression a relationship between tariff rate, domestic oilseed output and world 
prices can be estimated, which can then be used as a tariff rule.  
3.1.8  Welfare measures used 
Producer surplus: Producer benefit is obtained as the difference in average post 
and pre intervention producer surplus. Producer surplus is defined as revenue (which is a 
product of realized output and realized price) less costs (which are given by the area 
under the supply curve). The supply curve gives planned output (q*) that corresponds to 
different values of expected future price (p
e).  
If the inverse supply function is given as p
e =  α + β q* then the expression for 
producer surplus(PS) is given as PS = pq ￿ (αq* + β (q*)
2 / 2), where p and q are realized 
price and output respectively.
10 
Consumer surplus: We compute consumer benefit as the difference between the 
post and pre intervention average consumer surplus. Consumer surplus for a commodity 
is measured as the area under the inverse demand curve less the actual expenditure 
incurred on its consumption.  
Government Surplus:  Benefit to government is taken to be the difference between 
the pre and post intervention costs incurred by it. 
                                                           
10 Theoretically, in a situation with uncertain incomes the benefit from price stabilizing intervention can be 
classified into two different parts transfer benefits, and risk benefits. However we chose to ignore the risk 
benefits as it is usually a small fraction of the transfer benefits.   38
3.1.9  Description of different possible scenarios 
1.  Pre liberalization scenario: In both oilseed and edible markets there are 
restrictions on external trade. Imports of oils are canalized through state trading 
agencies and import of oilseeds prohibited. Stabilization of oilseed/oil prices 
involves addition to public buffer stocks to defend the floor price (MSP) and 
increase domestic supply through canalized imports to defend the ceiling price. 
2.  Post liberalization scenarios involving stabilization of only price of oilseeds and 
not that of oils: Stabilization is through variable tariffs/subsidies. Two alternatives 
are considered under this case. a) Variable levies computed as equilibrium 
outcomes and b) variable levies obtained from policy/administrative rule. In case 
(a) the width of the price band is varied to obtain different levels of price stability. 
3.  Liberalized trade scenario where only oil prices are stabilized with two 
alternatives: a) variable levies computed as equilibrium outcomes and b) variable 
levies obtained from policy/administrative rule. In case (a) the width of the price 
band is varied to obtain different levels of price stability. 
4.  No price stabilization scenario: Liberalized trade scenario where neither the price 
of oil nor that of oilseed is stabilized. 
5.  Tariff protection on oil imports: Liberalized trade scenario without price 
stabilization intervention and base-level tariff on oil imports to protect domestic 
processing sector.   39
6.  Tariff protection on oilseed imports: Liberalized trade scenario without price 
stabilization intervention and base level tariff on import of oilseeds to protect 
domestic producers. 
The last two scenarios are used to reflect the concerns of the government in 
protecting domestic farmers. Trade liberalization is expected to result in imports filling 
up domestic shortages driving down the prices of edible oils and oilseeds. Price support 
to farmers through import tariffs help in the short run adjustment process.  
In the liberalized trade scenarios where prices are stabilized through variable 
levies, we should in general allow for situations where in some years oilseed prices can 
be very low due to bumper crop output. In such situations defending a floor price would 
involve either the use of buffer stocks or subsidies on exports. Since India is currently 
deficient in the production of oilseeds we rule out this possibility in our scenarios as this 
event is likely to be rare.    40
4.  RESULTS FROM MODEL SIMULATIONS 
 
 
4.1  DOES PRICE PROTECTION TO DOMESTIC PROCESSING SECTOR LEAD 
TO PROTECTION OF OILSEED GROWERS?  
 
The last two set of scenarios described above help us answer this question. How 
does a tariff on import of oils affect the price of oilseeds and the crushing margins of the 
processing sector? The simulations results show the following. 
•  As the tariff protection on oil imports is lowered, there is not only a decrease in 
domestic prices but also a reduction in price variability. This means that while 
greater protection to the domestic processing sector implies increased domestic 
prices (Table 10) it also makes them more unstable. The correlation between 
domestic output fluctuations and international prices is such that freeing up of 
imports would stabilize domestic prices even though world prices are more 
variable than domestic prices.
11 Imposing a tariff barrier prevents this from 
happening. A system of variable levies can however help in the stabilization of 
domestic prices. Distinction needs to be made therefore between a base level tariff 
meant to protect domestic producers and a system of variable levies by which 
additional tariff is imposed to stabilize prices based on the international prices and 
domestic supply situation. Total tariff would then be the sum of base tariff and 
variable tariff which in the case of price band stabilization could be referred to as 
price band tariff. 
                                                           
11 The correlation coefficient between domestic oilseed output and international price of oils is found to be 
positive in most of the oils. For example, the estimates of correlation coefficients are 0.88, 0.83, 0.29 
respectively for soybeans, rapeseed-mustard and groundnuts.   41
•  Tariff protection from oil imports does not affect oilseed prices much (neither the 
mean price nor its coefficient of variation) 
•  Tariff protection on oil imports affects consumers adversely since the prices rise 
on an average. A 45% tariff on oil for example, leads to a 13% rise in domestic 
market equilibrium price and consumption decreases by 4%. Variability increases 
in both consumption and prices (Table 11). 
•  Processing sector benefits however. Crushing margins rise on an average. 
Average revenue goes up and the variability in revenue is also decreased. 
•  Benefits to oilseed producers are comparatively much less. The increase in 
average producer revenue is only 3% as compared to the 13% rise in the revenue 
to processors. Other things remaining constant an increase in oil tariffs e.g. would 
directly increase the crush margins and hence the surplus for processors. This 
would increase the crush demand and thereby increase the price of oilseeds 
indirectly benefiting the farmers. Since it is a second round effect the latter 
benefits are lower.  
While tariff protection on oils reduces oil imports as expected, it leads to an 
increase in the imports of oilseeds (assuming there is no tariff protection for oilseed 
imports). Least reduction is found in Palm oil imports (16%) compared to 84% reduction 
for Rapeseed/mustard oil and 67% for Soybean oil (Table 12). 
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Table 10￿Impact on prices due to tariff barriers on edible oil imports 
 
Base level tariffs on edible oil imports 
  0% 15% 30% 45% 
Mean oilseed price (Rupees/quintal) 
Groundnut 978.899  986.147 988.059 971.87 
Soybean 864.108 881.505 893.851 903.027 
Rapeseed 815.225 838.666 828.656 825.357 
Other 943.18 948.076 974.062 972.286 
CV of oilseed price 
Groundnut 0.287 0.286 0.291 0.294 
Soybean 0.18 0.186 0.197 0.204 
Rapeseed 0.234 0.236 0.239 0.237 
Other 0.28 0.29 0.289 0.291 
Mean oil prices (Rupees/quintal) 
Groundnut 3105.188 3141.277 3161.157 3134.155 
Soybean 1917.453 2034.627 2112.74 2170.746 
Rapeseed 2490.547 2618.283 2663.269 2693.599 
Palm 2620.251 2987.824 3313.401 3669.43 
Other 2597.42 2701.127 2831.415 2874.16 
CV of oil prices 
Groundnut 0.154 0.157 0.164 0.165 
Soybean 0.373 0.385 0.4 0.413 
Rapeseed 0.11 0.117 0.125 0.133 
Palm 0.175 0.179 0.18 0.177 
Other 0.175 0.19 0.2 0.207 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
Note: Tariff on oilseed imports is fixed at zero.   43
Table 11￿Impact on consumers, producers and processors due to tariff barriers 
on edible oil imports 
 
Base level tariffs on edible oil imports 
  0% 15% 30% 45%
Mean price of all oils  2568.317 2707.541 2822.498  2900.17
CV of price of all oils  0.085 0.089 0.094  0.095
Mean cons of all oils  9.958 9.778 9.632  9.524
CV of cons of all oils  0.028 0.032 0.036  0.037
Mean prod rev  18730.29 18936.15 19388.57  19335.65
CV of prod rev  0.152 0.158 0.156  0.157
Mean value of crushing margins 
Groundnut 725.941 733.635 739.953  744.963
Soybean 66.322 69.547 70.95  71.983
Rapeseed 556.592 580.797 607.587  622.199
Other 339.493 369.391 387.804  403.802
CV of crushing margins 
Groundnut 0.126 0.11 0.099  0.096
Soybean 0.513 0.442 0.431  0.404
Rapeseed 0.188 0.167 0.137  0.107
Other 0.367 0.316 0.277  0.234
      
Mean processor rev  9320.693 9929.694 10417.63  10755.55
Cv of processor rev  0.2 0.179 0.158  0.134
Consumer surplus  173420.9 168187.2 164017.5  161451.2
Producer surplus  9181.403 9186.453 9498.635  9460.337
 
  Source: Model Simulations. 
  Note: Prices are measured in Rupees per quintal and surplus measure in Rupees Crores. 
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Table 12￿Impact on imports due to tariff barrier on edible oil imports 
 
Base level tariffs on edible oil imports 
  0% 15% 30% 45% 
Mean oil imports 
Groundnut 0.029 0.013 0.002 0 
Soybean 0.188 0.123 0.088 0.062 
Rapeseed 0.218 0.138 0.072 0.034 
Palm 1.408 1.329 1.259 1.183 
Other 0.56 0.395 0.272 0.187 
CV of oil imports 
Groundnut 2.101 2.501 2.521 0 
Soybean 1.222 1.609 1.962 2.292 
Rapeseed 0.8 1.092 1.616 2.051 
Palm 0.07 0.086 0.101 0.117 
Other 0.83 1.068 1.412 1.698 
Mean seed imports 
Groundnut 1.362 1.364 1.364 1.41 
Soybean 2.022 2.25 2.23 2.268 
Rapeseed 1.915 2.132 2.169 2.241 
Other 2.143 2.494 2.687 2.895 
CV of seed imports 
Groundnut 0.478 0.471 0.468 0.458 
Soybean 1.055 0.887 0.915 0.846 
Rapeseed 0.625 0.547 0.54 0.506 
Other 0.79 0.66 0.568 0.486 
 
Source: Model Simulations. 
Note: Quantities are measured in million tones. 
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4.2  HOW DOES PROTECTION OF OILSEED GROWERS FROM IMPORTS  
            AFFECT CONSUMERS AND THE PROCESSING SECTOR? 
 
•  Prices of both oilseeds and oils rise as the protection to oilseed growers is 
increased. Price variability of soybean and soybean oil reduces while for others 
there is not much change (Table 13). Variability in the price of all oils taken 
together goes down. This result is in contrast to what was observed in the case of 
edible oils where tariff protection led to an increase in price volatility. This again 
can be explained by the nature of the correlation between international prices of 
oilseeds and domestic oilseed output. 
•  In terms of benefits to different agents we find that while oilseed producers tend 
to gain from tariff protection, consumers of edible oil and processors tend to lose 
out. 
•  Consumption of oils goes down though marginally.  
•  Although the prices of oils rise with the rise in oilseed prices, the net effect on 
crushing margins is negative. Percentage reduction in crushing margin is the 
maximum in the case of Soybean (Table 14). 
•  As expected greater protection leads to lower imports. Tariff protection for 
oilseeds leads to an increase in oil imports (when the latter does not face any tariff 
barriers) (Table 15). Vice versa also holds as seen earlier.   46
Table 13￿Impact on prices due to tariff barrier on oilseed imports 
 
Base level tariff 
  0% 15% 30% 45% 
Mean seed prices 
Groundnut 978.899 1116.967 1211.281 1261.444 
Soybean 864.108 919.823 952.915 977.5 
Rapeseed 815.225 932.303 987.624 1048.281 
Other 943.18 1022.288 1096.498 1134.17 
CV of seed prices  
Groundnut 0.287 0.282 0.288 0.303 
Soybean 0.18 0.128 0.091 0.077 
Rapeseed 0.234 0.221 0.221 0.237 
Other 0.28 0.264 0.236 0.207 
Mean oil prices 
Groundnut 3105.188 3332.72 3488.247 3568.963 
Soybean 1917.453 2179.388 2327.031 2429.443 
Rapeseed 2490.547 2648.257 2704.708 2774.831 
Palm 2620.251 2639.825 2622.577 2629.9 
Other 2597.42 2727.757 2831.591 2893.197 
CV of oil prices 
Groundnut 0.154 0.16 0.166 0.177 
Soybean 0.373 0.248 0.176 0.159 
Rapeseed 0.11 0.108 0.111 0.112 
Palm 0.175 0.176 0.175 0.17 
Other 0.175 0.165 0.151 0.145 
 
Source: Model Simulations. 
Note: Prices are measured in Rupees per quintal. Tariff on oil is fixed at zero.   47
Table 14￿Impact on consumers, producers and processors due to tariff barrier on 
Oilseed imports 
 
Base level tariff 
  0% 15% 30% 45% 
Mean price of all oils  2568.317 2723.091 2813.287 2877.572 
CV of price of all oils  0.085 0.077 0.073 0.072 
Mean cons of all oils  9.958 9.766 9.657 9.577 
Cv of cons of all oils  0.028 0.026 0.025 0.025 
Mean value of crushing margins 
Groundnut 725.941 682.072 652.146 636.653 
Soybean 66.322 56.707 49.601 43.04 
Rapeseed 556.592 498.344 469.963 443.013 
Other 339.493 311.262 280.701 264.167 
CV of crushing margins 
Groundnut 0.126 0.157 0.188 0.212 
Soybean 0.513 0.533 0.465 0.483 
Rapeseed 0.188 0.234 0.241 0.277 
Other 0.367 0.403 0.416 0.385 
      
Mean prod rev  18730.29 21196.57 23200.67 24419.02 
CV of prod rev  0.152 0.135 0.117 0.105 
Mean processor rev  9320.693 8167.038 7334.431 6798.269 
CV of processor rev  0.2 0.227 0.228 0.23 
Consumer surplus  173420.9 167235.3 163683.7 161230.2 
Producer surplus  9181.403 10255.97 11286.92 11831.16 
 
Source: Model Simulations.   48
Table 15￿Impact on imports due to tariff barrier on oilseed imports 
 
                    Base  level tariff 
  0% 15% 30% 45% 
Mean oilseed imports 
Groundnut 1.362 0.987 0.72 0.591 
Soybean 2.022 1.334 0.722 0.242 
Rapeseed 1.915 1.495 1.092 0.807 
Other 2.143 1.594 1.062 0.773 
CV of oilseed imports 
Groundnut 0.478 0.685 0.898 1.049 
Soybean 1.055 1.33 1.7 2.911 
Rapeseed 0.625 0.763 0.976 1.175 
Other 0.79 1.025 1.34 1.526 
Mean oil imports 
Groundnut 0.029 0.044 0.055 0.06 
Soybean 0.188 0.224 0.262 0.307 
Rapeseed 0.218 0.3 0.345 0.384 
Palm 1.408 1.403 1.407 1.405 
Other 0.56 0.642 0.743 0.796 
CV of oil imports 
Groundnut 2.101 1.76 1.655 1.677 
Soybean 1.222 1.112 0.806 0.725 
Rapeseed 0.8 0.657 0.552 0.538 
Palm 0.07 0.071 0.07 0.068 
Other 0.83 0.735 0.603 0.505 
 
Source: Model Simulations. 
Note: Quantities are measured in million tonnes. Tariff on oil is fixed at zero.   49
4.3  WHAT ARE THE WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE PRICE 
STABILIZATION MECHANISMS? 
 
We consider three different mechanisms for stabilizing edible oil/oilseed prices. 
In scenario I market prices are prevented from going above the ceiling level of the price 
band through canalized imports by the government. In scenario II we assume that private 
agents are allowed to freely import edible oils subject to import tariffs. Here variable 
levies are imposed on imports in order to keep prices within a specified band. In scenario 
III variable levies are fixed following an administrative rule that depends on the deviation 
of market price from a trend/reference level. The last scenario (scenario IV) is one where 
there is no price stabilization intervention.  
First we consider the case where only edible oil prices are stabilized and then the 
case where only oilseed prices are stabilized. We note the following from our simulation 
results. 
•  Variability in oilseed prices and in crushing margins is not affected much by oil 
price stabilization under any of the mechanisms considered (Table 16). However, 
oilseed price stabilization leads to greater stability in oil prices and crushing 
margins (Table 17). 
•  Price variability appears to be the least in the canalized trade scenario (scenario I) 
with the exception of groundnut and soybean oil. 
•  With respect to welfare impact of oilseed price stabilization on different agents 
we find that producer surplus increases with price stabilization and it is the 
maximum under the canalized trade scenario. Consumer surplus decreases and is   50
the least in the canalized trade case. Revenue accruing to the processing sector is 
also the least in this case. 
•  In the case of oil price stabilization also producer surplus is the greatest and 
consumer surplus the least when canalized trade is used for stabilization purpose. 
However, in the variable levies case (scenarios II and III) it is the opposite result, 
producer surplus decreases consumer surplus increases though the magnitudes of 
increase/decrease are quite low (Tables 18 and 19). 
The next set of simulations deal with varying the degrees of oil price stabilization by 
choosing a price band of varying width and using the mechanism of variable levies 
(import tax/subsidy) for price stabilization. In one set of simulations we assume a base 
level tariff of 30% to provide a certain degree of protection to domestic 
producers/processors. In the other set we assume no protection (base level tariff is set to 
zero). 
•  Decrease in the width of the price band for oil leads to decrease in mean prices as 
well as decrease in their variability (Tables 20). 
•  The narrower the price band the higher the magnitude of variable levies needed 
for price stabilization. The maximum value taken by the variable levies are much 
below the bound rate fixed under the WTO agreement. (Table 21). 
•  The magnitudes of the import tax and import subsidies are such that on an average 
the cost burden on government is quite small in maintaining the price band policy 
(Table 22).   51
•  Gain to consumers increases with greater price stability, but the loss producers 
and processors also rises.  
 
Table 16￿Price variability under different mechanisms for oil price stabilization 
(No oilseed price stabilization) 
 
Scenarios 
                I  II III IV 
CV of seed prices 
Groundnut 0.287 0.287 0.291 0.29 
Soybean 0.133 0.109 0.104 0.122 
Rapeseed 0.218 0.221 0.209 0.212 
Other 0.235 0.236 0.229 0.263 
CV of oil prices 
Groundnut 0.177 0.174 0.18 0.173 
Soybean 0.231 0.192 0.176 0.222 
Rapeseed 0.109 0.106 0.078 0.112 
Palm 0.001 0.119 0.065 0.175 
Other 0.133 0.13 0.113 0.188 
CV of crushing margins 
Groundnut 0.129 0.138 0.132 0.148 
Soybean 0.428 0.47 0.456 0.445 
Rapeseed 0.2 0.239 0.247 0.204 
Other 0.365 0.395 0.424 0.364 
 
Source: Model Simulations. 
 
Note:  
The scenarios are defined as follows. 
I.  Price band policy where price ceiling is defended through canalized imports but no stocking 
policy to support the floor price.  
II.  Price band policy where both floor and ceiling prices are defended through tax/subsidy on 
imports. 
III.  Price band defended through administrative tariff rule. 
IV.  No price stabilization (reference scenario) 
 
Price band is defined as a 15 percent deviation from target price. In the simulations target 
price is taken to be the border price corresponding to the base year.  
Base level tariff on oils/oilseeds is fixed at 30%. 
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Table 17￿Price variability under different mechanisms for oilseed price stabilization 
(No oil price stabilization) 
 
Scenarios 
  I II III IV 
CV of oilseed prices 
Groundnut 0.108 0.125 0.101 0.29 
Soybean 0.079 0.094 0.093 0.122 
Rapeseed 0.104 0.13 0.075 0.212 
Other 0.104 0.128 0.109 0.263 
CV of oil prices 
Groundnut 0.066 0.075 0.061 0.173 
Soybean 0.154 0.173 0.172 0.222 
Rapeseed 0.079 0.08 0.061 0.112 
Palm 0.18 0.181 0.18 0.175 
Other 0.123 0.115 0.106 0.188 
CV of crushing margins 
Groundnut 0.068 0.067 0.052 0.148 
Soybean 0.342 0.407 0.431 0.445 
Rapeseed 0.139 0.131 0.096 0.204 
Other 0.219 0.258 0.249 0.364 
 
Source: Model Simulations. 
Note:  
The scenarios are defined as follows. 
V.  Price band policy where price ceiling is defended through canalized imports but no stocking 
policy to support the floor price.  
VI.  Price band policy where both floor and ceiling prices are defended through tax/subsidy on 
imports. 
VII. Price band defended through administrative tariff rule. 
VIII. No price stabilization (reference scenario) 
 
Price band is defined as a 15 percent deviation from target price. In the simulations target 
price is taken to be the border price corresponding to the base year.  
Base level tariff on oils/oilseeds is fixed at 30%. 
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Table 18￿Welfare impacts under different mechanisms for oil price stabilization 
(No oilseed price stabilization) 
 
Scenarios 
  I II  III  IV 
Mean producer revenue  24953.03 24218.95 24333.13 24573.8 
Mean processor revenue  8775.741 8300.212 8318.374 8388.282 
Total consumer surplus  148848.5 153795.4 154240 151982 
Total producer surplus  12190.65 11701.15 11867.05 11978.42 
Government surplus  302.8 -0.094 -0.109 0 
 
Source: Model simulations 




Table 19￿Welfare impacts under different mechanisms for oilseed price 
stabilization (No oil price stabilization) 
 
Scenarios 
   I II  III  IV 
Mean producer revenue  28023.05 25386.26 25694.54 24573.8
Mean processor revenue  7031.623 8123.315 8061.181 8388.282
Consumer surplus  144511.7 148984.6 148820.6 151982
Producer surplus  13709.94 12342.41 12604.5 11978.42
Government surplus  272.6 0.302 0.305 0
 
Source: Model simulations. 
Note: Surplus measures are in Rupees Crores. 
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Table 20￿Price variability under different degrees of oil price stabilization 
 
            Bandwidth of the price band 
   0% 10% 15% 30% 
Mean seed prices 
Groundnut 1220.444 1227.393 1226.334 1206.961 
Soybean 993.183 999.693 994.345 1001.249 
Rapeseed 1011.319 1042.502 1020.96 1022.710 
Other 1088.818 1108.123 1138.774 1160.893 
CV of seed prices 
Groundnut 0.287 0.287 0.291 0.29 
Soybean 0.098 0.104 0.108 0.122 
Rapeseed 0.203 0.219 0.215 0.212 
Other 0.201 0.226 0.235 0.258 
Mean oil prices 
Groundnut 3583.347 3595.904 3585.810 3539.617 
Soybean 2586.727 2611.948 2591.590 2630.963 
Rapeseed 2897.471 2979.760 2952.188 2974.196 
Palm 3101.436 3185.794 3178.967 3305.479 
Other 2867.408 2973.729 3046.436 3126.182 
all oils  2992.204 3062.453 3073.910 3120.877 
CV of oil prices 
Groundnut 0.177 0.177 0.177 0.173 
Soybean 0.162 0.178 0.189 0.221 
Rapeseed 0.052 0.088 0.104 0.112 
Palm 0.000 0.083 0.119 0.169 
Other 0.071 0.111 0.129 0.172 
all oils  0.049 0.06 0.067 0.079 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
Note: This table relates to oil price stabilization scenarios with base level tariff fixed at 30% for  
           both oils and oilseeds. Prices are measured in Rupees per quintal.   55
Table 21￿Tariff variability under different degrees of oil price stabilization 
Bandwidth of the price band 
  0% 10% 15% 30% 
Mean import tax on oils 
Groundnut 0.625 0.083 0.05 0 
Soybean 0.155 0.045 0.024 0 
Rapeseed 0.227 0.018 0 0 
Palm 0.116 0.031 0.01 0 
Other 0.187 0.026 0.016 0 
Mean import subsidy on oils 
Groundnut 0.567 0.035 0.023 0 
Soybean 0.133 0.057 0.037 0 
Rapeseed 0.247 0.035 0.012 0 
Palm 0.147 0.058 0.041 0.005 
Other 0.297 0.093 0.064 0.014 
CV of import tax on oils 
Groundnut 0.193 1.412 1.53 0 
Soybean 0.702 1.368 1.603 0 
Rapeseed 0.428 1.868 0 0 
Palm 0.853 1.51 1.492 0 
Other 0.657 2.904 2.983 0 
CV of import subsidy on oils 
Groundnut 0.215 1.488 1.471 0 
Soybean 0.819 1.35 1.474 4.082 
Rapeseed 0.394 2.096 3.166 0 
Palm 0.674 1.451 1.535 1.561 
Other 0.423 1.211 1.382 2.802 
Max import tax on oils 
Groundnut 0.791 0.25 0.179 0 
Soybean 0.287 0.154 0.09 0 
Rapeseed 0.341 0.081 0 0 
Palm 0.252 0.101 0.032 0 
Other 0.448 0.25 0.161 0 
Max import subsidy on oils 
Groundnut 0.694 0.113 0 0 
Soybean 0.288 0.195 0.151 0.012 
Rapeseed 0.461 0.276 0.169 0 
Palm 0.264 0.18 0.139 0.016 
Other 0.498 0.411 0.357 0.154 
Source: Model simulations. 
Note: This table relates to oil price stabilization scenarios with base level tariff fixed at 30% for  
          both oils and oilseeds. Tax/subsidy rates are expressed as a fraction of border price.   56
Table 22￿Welfare impacts under different degrees of oil price stabilization 
 
Bandwidth of the price band 
  0% 10% 15% 30% 
Mean cons of all oils  9.412 9.331 9.322 9.262 
Cv of cons of all oils  0.019 0.023 0.026 0.032 
Mean prod rev  23868.85 24102.84 24371.85 24526.95 
Cv of prod rev  0.118 0.123 0.122 0.125 
Mean processor rev  8221.6 8289.068 8301.765 8359.36 
Cv of processor rev  0.239 0.229 0.217 0.206 
Consumer surplus  156911.9 154340.1 153937.7 152428.8 
Producer surplus  11664.73 11645.55 11885.94 11955.71 
Government surplus  -0.229 -0.119 -0.091 -0.017 
 
Source: Model simulations. 
Note: This table relates to oil price stabilization scenarios with base level tariff fixed at 30% for  




The above results from simulation analysis allow a clear ranking of alternative 
price stabilization policies. 
The results in table 23 reveal that price stabilization in oilseeds reduces total 
domestic welfare. In the case of oils government stock intervention (scenario I) reduces 
total domestic welfare, but scenarios II and III provide an increase in welfare. Thus, only 
two out of the six alternatives (three scenarios each for stabilizing oilseed and oil prices 
respectively) dominate the ￿no-price stabilization￿ scenario. 
Table 24 shows that producers lose and consumers gain in scenarios II and III for 
oils, whereas the opposite holds in scenarios II and III for oilseeds. In the case of 
stabilizing oilseed prices there is a welfare transfer from consumers to producers in all the 
three scenarios. In the case of oils only in scenario I (government￿s stock policies) there   57
is welfare transfer from consumers to producers whereas the opposite is the case in 
scenarios II and III.  
 
 
Table 23￿Welfare ranking of alternative policies 
 
Price stabilization of Oils  Price stabilization of Oilseeds   
Scenario 
 









1698 -1.5  1655  -4.0 
II: Variable levies 
(endogenously 
determined) 
1738 +0.8  1694  -1.7 
III: Variable levies 
(rule based) 
1744 +1.2  1695  -1.7 
IV: No price 
stabilization  
1724   1724   
 
Note: Total surplus is the sum of the surpluses of processors; producers, consumers and government (see 
Tables 18 and 19 for more details). 
 
 
Table 24￿Changes in consumer and producer surplus from the ￿no-price 
stabilization￿ case 
 
  % change in consumer 
surplus 
% change in producer surplus 
  Oils Oilseeds Oils Oilseeds 
Government stocks 
and canalized trade 




+1.2 -2.0 -2.3 +3.0 
Variable levies 
(rule based) 
+1.5 -2.1 -0.9 +5.2 
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Table 25￿Maximum import tax on oils required for price band policy 
 





bound rate  Sliding 
scale 
Linear 
harmonization Swiss  Harmonization 
low ceiling 
Groundnut 25  300 50  45  37.6 25.0 
Soybean 15.4  45  17.11  16.7  19.4 22.5 
Rapeseed 8.1 75  28.5  25.8 25.1 25.0 
Palm 10.1  300  50  45  37.6 25.0 
 
Source: Maximum rates for stabilization (author￿s computations).Other rates Chand, 2003).  
Note: Price band allows for a 15% deviation of domestic oil price from trend target price. 
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5. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
India￿s share in world oilseed production is fairly large. The growth in oilseed 
output has been remarkable in the last decade. Until recently the government of India had 
discouraged imports of oilseeds as an incentive to domestic producers. This hurt the 
domestic processing industry which has excess crushing capacity. However the 
government had also been controlling the imports of edible oils that helped processors at 
the cost of consumers. With the recent liberalization of trade in edible oils and oilseeds 
and the rapid growth in domestic demand import of vegetable oils is likely to increase in 
the coming years. Highly volatile international prices and unstable domestic yields for 
oilseeds make it important for the government to devise ways to manage domestic price 
volatility. 
This study examines alternative price stabilization policies for edible oils and 
oilseeds in India. The impact of price stabilization on different agents, the farmers 
growing oilseeds the consumers of edible oil and the processing sector is examined with 
the help of a multi market equilibrium stochastic dynamic model. Different alternative 
mechanisms of price stabilization are compared for their effectiveness in talking price 
variability and the impact on consumers, producers and processors. 
The following are some of the main results obtained from the stochastic 
simulation exercises.  
Higher import tariffs on edible oils lead to not only higher but more variable 
domestic prices. This however does not rule out the usefulness of variable levies in 
stabilizing oil prices even if the base level tariff on edible oil imports are fixed at a   60
minimal or zero level. We need to make a distinction between base level tariff meant to 
protect domestic producers and a system of variable levies by which additional tariff is 
imposed to stabilize prices based on the international prices and domestic supply 
situation.  
Tariff protection on oils mainly benefits the processing sector and the benefits to 
oilseed growers are relatively smaller. Greater tariffs on oil imports lead to lower oil 
imports, oilseed imports are found to increase.  
Tariff protection to growers by increasing tariffs on oilseed imports helps the 
producers of oilseeds, but at the cost of consumers and the processing sector. Prices of 
both oilseed and oils increase. However, in contrast to what was observed in the case of 
tariff on oils we see in the case of oilseeds that price volatility is reduced due tariff 
protection.  
The distribution of benefits to different agents varies with the different alternative 
mechanisms used for price stabilization. Price stabilization appears to be most effective 
with the use of canalized trade. Producers of oilseeds benefit the most under this option 
while consumers and processors benefit the least. The opposite is the case under the 
alternative of variable levies. The magnitude of import tax and subsidies are such that on 
an average the cost burden on government due to variable levies is quite low. 
The results clearly show that although freeing of imports of edible oils could 
increase the vulnerability of domestic consumers and producers to fluctuations in world 
prices erecting fixing tariff barriers may not be of help. A system of variable tariffs is 
what would be needed. It is also seen that tariff protection helps mainly domestic 
processing sector (crushing and refining units) rather than oilseed growers.   61
One can affect the degree of oil price stabilization by varying the width of the 
price band. Narrow price band implies greater price stability, higher benefits to 
consumers and lower benefits to producers and processors. 
As the bound rates of tariffs under WTO are fixed quite high for all edible oils 
with the exception of soy oil, there is enough room to adjust import duties for price 
stabilization purposes. Based on the past trends in fluctuations in domestic production 
and international prices we find in our simulations that the maximum import tariff 
required to stabilize prices within a reasonable price band is quite low (see Table 25). 
The maximum rate required for any of the oils does not exceed 25%. The current 
bound rates thus give sufficient room for operating variable levies for price stabilization 
in addition to a base rate tariff that is used to protect domestic producers. In the case of 
groundnut oil and palm oil the bound rates are large enough to permit a base tariff 
exceeding even 200%. The cheaper soy oil with a low bound rate (45%) would however 
put a downward pressure on domestic price of other oils due to substitution possibilities 
in consumption. Since the maximum tariff required for operating a policy of variable 
levies is 15%, the base tariff in the case of Soy oil e.g. cannot exceed 30% under current 
bound rate. Further reductions in bound tariffs sought in future negotiations on market 
access, based on certain formulas, indicate that if any of these formulas is to be agreed 
upon then India has not much scope for protecting its edible oil sector, though it would 
still have sufficient room for varying tariff for price stabilization purpose. In such a 
situation, if there are extreme fluctuations in world prices or sudden import surges, then 
India might have to fall back upon the special safeguard provisions under the WTO. 
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Box 1￿NDDB and Edible Oils 
 
 
Encouraged by the success of the co-operative movement under the aegis of the 
National Dairy Development Board (NDDB) the government has brought other primary 
commodities like edible oil, fruit and vegetables under the ambit of NDDB.  
NDDB initiated the ’Restructuring Edible Oil and Oilseeds Production and 
Marketing’ Project in 1979 to increase farmer investment in oilseeds sector through 
farmer-owned co-operatives. More than 9 lakh farmers have joined nearly 5,500 oilseeds 
growers’ co-operative societies affiliated to 18 unions in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu. Capacities 
have been created to crush 3,735 tonnes per day (TPD) oilseeds; solvent-extract 2,180 
TPD oil cake; and to refine 778 TPD of edible oil. Storage has been built to handle 1.9 
lakh mt. oilseeds and 2.96 lakh mt. oil.  
The traditional mono-cropping of oilseeds entails risks for both the producer and 
the co-operative. To reduce these uncertainties, the project has promoted a multi-oilseeds 
cropping system supported by introduction of non-traditional oilseeds crops.  
The NDDB was appointed the Market Intervention Agency for oilseeds and 
edible oil by the Government of India in 1989 and was charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring remunerative prices to farmers, reasonable prices to consumers and attaining 
self-sufficiency.  
In order to establish a direct link between producers and consumers of oil and 
thereby reduce the role of oil traders and oil exchanges, NDDB decided to enter the 
consumer pack market for edible oil through its Dhara refined rapeseed oil and 
groundnut oil. With its tamper-proof packing and high quality it has been successful in 
slowly weaning away the consumer from buying oil in bulk. It is teaching them not to 
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APPENDIX￿Oilseed/Edible Oil Price Stabilization Model 
  
 
This appendix describes the multi commodity stochastic simulation model to 
analyze different price stabilization mechanisms for the oilseed sector. The model deals 
simultaneously with markets for oilseeds/oils/meals. Production shocks are generated 
using random number generator. Shocks to world price of oil/oilseed are also generated 
in a similar fashion. Equilibrium values of price, output, stocks etc, corresponding to any 
randomly realized state of the world are then computed with the help multi commodity 
equilibrium model formulated as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP). A large 
number of simulations are carried out and the average of values obtained in these 
simulations is computed for different variables such as prices, consumption, production, 
producer revenue and measures of consumer, producer and government surplus. The 
impacts of alternative price stabilization policies, price band/ support price policies on 
price stability and welfare are then obtained. 
It has been observed widely in the literature that scope for private inter year 
storage is limited, especially in the presence of public intervention for price stabilization 
purposes. We therefore do not model private storage in this study as we deal with inter 
year price stabilization. 
For each type of oil considered market clearance is achieved for all the three 
products oilseeds, oil and meal simultaneously. Five oils are considered for the empirical 
implementation of the model: groundnut, soybean, rapeseed/mustard, palmolein and 
other.  Basis for the choice of oils: groundnut, soybean and rapeseed/mustard together 
account for over 80% of oilseeds grown in the country and around 70% of the total edible 
oil consumed. Palm oil forms around 70% of edible oil imports by India. All edible oils   65
and all oilseeds (with the exception of groundnuts) can be considered to be importable 
and oil meals exportable. The model structure takes into account the possibility of world 
prices being influenced by the quantity of India￿s imports (the large country assumption). 
Base year data used in the model is given are the table below. Quantities are in 
million tonnes and prices in Rupees per quintal 
Percentage deviations from trend values of domestic production of oilseeds and 
the frequency of occurrence of these deviations are obtained from past data. The tables 
below provide the discrete probability distributions for the shocks to domestic output of 
oilseeds and trend world prices of oils/oilseeds.    66
Table A1￿Base year (1997-99) data 
 
  Groundnut Soybean  Rapeseed  Palm  others 
          
oil imports  0.1  0.347  0.145  1.312  0.285 
Meal exports  0.319  2.960  0.313    0.416 
          
border price of oilseed  856  840  750    856 
border price of oil  3605  2158  2161  2209  2161 
border price of meal  800  786  800    800 
          
trade margins for oil  1.074  1.08  1.082  1.08  1.074 
trade margins for meals  0.926  0.92  0.918    0.926 
trade margins for seeds  1.12  1.08  1.08    1.12 
          
domestic seed price  1537.8  917  1435    1537.8 
domestic oil price  4239.4  2367  3918.6  3067  4239.4 
domestic meal price  660  660  660    660 
          
Domestic demand for seed  3.582  4.989  4.686    7 
Domestic demand for oil  1.483  1.225  1.893  1.312  2.756 
Domestic demand for meal  1.708  1.131  2.513    3 
          
domestic supply of seed  5.208  6.668  5.712  0  7.29 
domestic supply of oil  1.483  0.878  1.748  0  2.471 
domestic supply of meal  2.027  4.091  2.826  0  3.416 
 
Note: 
All quantities are in million tonnes; prices are in Rupees per quintal;  
All parameter values refer to average for the years 1997-1999.   
The data on domestic demand and production is taken from the FAOSTAT data base (average 
figures for the years 1997-99). Groundnut production is in shelled equivalents.  
Trade margin includes port charges + traders’ margin + marketing costs and is given as a 
factor by which border price is multiplied to obtain the import parity price (export parity price 
in the case of meal).  
 
Source of data for domestic price of oil/oilseeds is Agricultural prices in India, Directorate of 
Economics and Statistics (data relates to 98-99). ’Others’ excludes coconuts. Groundnut production 
is in shelled equivalents. 
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Table A2￿Percentage deviations from normal oilseed output 
(With associated probabilities in parentheses) 
 
  Groundnut Soybean  Rape  Other 


























Table A3￿Percentage deviations from trend world prices of oilseeds  
(With associated probabilities in parentheses) 
 
  Groundnut Soybean  Rape  Other 


























Table A4￿Percentage deviations from trend world prices of oils  
(With associated probabilities in parentheses) 
 
  Groundnut Soybean  Rape  Palm  Other 
































Percentage deviations from trend values of world oil/oilseed price and the 
frequency of occurrence of these deviations is obtained from the data given in WB edible 
oils report.   68
Table A5￿Average extraction rates used in the model for different oilseeds 
 
Extraction rates- 





Ground nut  0.566  0.414 
Soybean 0.82  0.176 
Rapeseed 0.603  0.373 
Others 0.488  0.353 
 
Source: Oil World, USDA as quoted in World Bank (1997). 
 
Extraction rates provide us information on the amount (by weight) of oil/meal 
produced by crushing unit weight of the particular oilseed. 
 




Elasticity of crush demand w. r. t. crush margins for 
all seeds 
+0.5 [short run elasticity estimates available for 
several countries fall in the range of 0.2 to 0.5] 
Price elasticity of demand for all oils  -0.5 
Price elasticity of demand for all meals  -0.5 
Income elasticity of demand for all oils  0.5 [income elasticity estimates in the literature are 
in the range of 0.39 to 0.88 (Gulati and Kelly, 
1999)] 
Income elasticity of meals  +0.5 
Price elasticity of supply of all oilseeds  +0.5 [estimates in the literature range from 0.05 to 
0.59 (Gulati and Kelly, 1999)] 




price band for oils/oilseeds: 
 
The lower and upper bounds of the price band are given as  
 
p_min = border price x (1 + tariff rate) x (1 + trade margin) x (1-band width); 
p_max = border price x (1 + tariff rate) x (1 + trade margin) x (1+band width) 
 
Band width is expressed a certain percentage deviation from the reference price 




cm = a x (price of oil) + b x (price of meal) ￿ (price of seed)   69
Price expectations of seeds/ oils: 
 
Moving average of prices realized in the previous five years. 
 
Import parity price for oils/oilseeds: 
 
Small country case: 
Import price = border price x (1 + base tariff rate) x (1 + trade margin) x 
(1+variable tariff) 
 
Large country case: 
Import price = border price x (1 + base tariff rate) x (1 + trade margin) x 
(1+variable tariff) + coefficient x (import quantity) 
(Where, the coefficient is derived from the assumed import price elasticity) 
 
Export parity price for meals: 
 
Export price = border price x (1 + trade margins) 
 
The working of the model in the closed economy case (see figure A1): 
 
1.  Planned seed output is a function of expected price which is taken as a five year 
moving average of past prices. Realized seed output is equal to planned output 
plus a random shock (due to uncertain weather, pests etc). Supply of seed is 
therefore a function of lagged seed prices. 
2.  Total demand for seed is the sum of crush demand plus other demand (food, feed 
etc). The latter is specified exogenously and the former is a function of crushing 
margins and income. Crushing margin itself is a function of seed price among 
other things. 
3.  Equilibrium price of seed is determined by the interaction of supply and demand. 
4.  Supply of oil/meal is determined from the crush demand for seeds, given by the 
technical extraction coefficients.   70
5.  Demand functions for oil/meal are functions of their respective prices and income. 
6.  Equilibrium prices of oils/meals are determined by demand supply interaction.  
The working of the model in the open economy case (see figure A2): 
 
The main difference in the open economy case is in the determination of 
equilibrium prices for seeds/oils/meals. If at the import parity price there is excess 
demand then equilibrium price is equal to the import parity price and net imports are 
equal to the excess demand. If at the import parity price there is excess supply then 
equilibrium price is determined as the price that equates domestic demand with domestic 
supply.  
Since meals are treated as exportables in the model, equilibrium prices of meals 
are equated to export parity price if there is excess supply at this price and net exports are 
equal to excess supply. If not, equilibrium price is the price that equates domestic demand 
and supply for meals and there are no exports. 
Thus we can see that in the open economy case seed supply depends on the world 
price situation. Seed supply is a function of expected seed price which is taken as the 
moving average of the equilibrium prices realized in the past and world prices influence 
equilibrium prices. 
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Figure A1￿Working of the model in the closed economy case 
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Figure A2￿ Working of the model in the open economy case 
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